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In this paper we pursue further an in￿ uential line of thought regarding nominal
price stickiness dating back to Barro (1972) and Sheshinski and Weiss (1977,
1983), analyses that were in turn motivated by the seminal work of Arrow, Harris
and Marschak (1951). This work on (S;s) pricing policies has been developed
recently by Caplin and Spulber (1987), Caplin and Leahy (1991), Caballero and
Engel (1991) and Caplin and Leahy (1997), and more recently still by Golosov
and Lucas (2003).
The basic idea behind all these (S;s) pricing models is straightforward enough;
￿rms face a resource cost of adjusting prices when demand or cost conditions alter.
As a consequence, observed prices of most, perhaps almost all, goods will di⁄er
from what would be the optimal price in the absence of this cost. The more
recent analyses in this vein have probed the macroeconomic signi￿cance of these
(S;s) pricing strategies. One of the basic insights that seems to emerge is that
nominal shocks will generally result in ￿ uctuations in real magnitudes, although
that need not always be so, as Caplin and Spulber showed (1987). However, many
macroeconomists believe such nonneutralities to be an important stylized fact that
macroeconomic models must match.
But there are other aspects of the data that many of these models have di¢ -
culty matching. First, in these models the impact of nominal shocks on aggregate
output is modest, short-lived and probably less than what we observe in the data.
The best evidence we know of on this score is Christiano et al. (2001). Second,
in practice price changes may not be highly synchronized (i.e., di⁄erent prices
may often move in di⁄erent directions in di⁄erent sectors), as Bils and Klenow
(2004) show for the US and Dhyne et al. (2004) demonstrate for countries in
the Euro area, whilst many (S;s) pricing models generally predict a high level
of synchronization. Third, there is evidence that there are systematic di⁄erences
across sectors in the economy in the frequency of price adjustment; again Bils and
Klenow (2004) document this for the US and Dhyne et al. (2004) show that the
same is true in the Euro area.1
This observed degree of price change asynchronization and the systematic sec-
toral asymmetries suggest that heterogeneity is an important issue that needs to be
incorporated in any successful (S;s) model. In an important contribution, Golosov
and Lucas (2003) introduce asymmetries in the form of idiosyncratic shocks and
1Dhyne et al. also document that the Euro area appears to have "stickier" prices than is the
case in the US.
2by simulating their model show that this helps rationalize price change asynchro-
nization. However, nominal shocks (even when monetary policy lacks credibility)
continue to explain only a minor amount of variation in output.
Introducing idiosyncratic shocks in this way is attractive, but it may be a less
useful way of incorporating systematic variation across sectors in the degree of
price ￿ exibility. One could imagine a model with di⁄erent sectors of the economy
systematically being bu⁄eted by di⁄erent sized shocks. Such a model would appear
capable of rationalizing price change asynchronization and systematic di⁄erences
in the frequency of price changes across sectors, with sectors prone to big shocks
(on a systematic basis) tending to change prices more frequently. However, as we
are interested, as far as possible, in obtaining analytical insights to the questions
we pose, such a model would pose formidable technical challenges.
In this paper we take a simpler approach which turns out to yield substan-
tial analytical results. Motivated by the observation that we just mentioned, that
there appears to be some systematic variation in the frequency of price adjustment
across goods, we analyze the e⁄ects of heterogenous costs of price adjustment. We
extend the important work of Caplin and Leahy (1997) by introducing multiple
sectors into the model economy, where each of these sectors is indexed by a dif-
ferent cost of price adjustment. In each sector of the economy ￿rms face the same
generic optimization problem as in the single sector set-up of Caplin and Leahy
(1997), but it turns out that their actions have starkly di⁄erent implications for
aggregate output and prices. Such a set-up is also consistent with a degree of price
asynchronization. As we demonstrate, the distribution of relative prices ceases to
be uniform as Caplin and Leahy (1997) found. This prediction of the model was,
in any case, counterfactual. We are able analytically to characterize the station-
ary distributions of output and prices for our model economy. We also show that
the stationary distribution of aggregate output ceases to be uniform, and becomes
dependent on the number of sectors.
Our model with multiple sectors may also deliver more plausible aggregate
dynamics than a single sector model. (S;s) models based on homogeneity of
costs tend to imply somewhat rigid dynamics; a sequence of positive (negative)
monetary shocks causes output to rise (fall), while entailing no nominal price re-
sponse, until some boundary is reached; further shocks in that positive (negative)
sequence a⁄ect only prices. With heterogeneous costs of price adjustment the
aggregate dynamics are more nuanced. For example, we demonstrate that, in
the stationary state, the correlation coe¢ cient between money shocks and output
initially rises in the variance of the money stock before falling, in contrast to the
3￿ndings of Caplin and Leahy (1997). We reconcile our result with theirs. We
also show that as we add heterogeneous sectors the correlation between money
shocks and output is lower in the multiple sector case (compared with the single
sector case) for relatively low monetary variance, and higher for relatively high
monetary variance. Adding heterogenous sectors in the way we do appears to
hold out the promise of increasing the importance of nominal shocks. Further, a
natural implication of our set-up is a degree of price asynchronization as in some
sectors average real prices may be rising or falling whilst in other sectors they are
moving in the opposite direction.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set out our framework
by extending the model of Caplin and Leahy (1997). In Section 3 we de￿ne the
optimal behavior of agents in di⁄erent sectors and discuss the distributions of
outputs and relative prices in each sector of the economy. We show that the
correlation between outputs in di⁄erent sectors is intimately related to the cost of
price adjustment, and the sense in which price changes are asynchronized emerges
here also. In Section 4 we obtain an explicit solution for the stationary distribution
of aggregate output in the case of two sectors. Appendix 4 shows how to generalize
that derivation, ￿rst to the case of three sectors and then to the K￿sector case. In
Section 5 we analyze the interaction at the macroeconomic level between money,
output and prices and demonstrate that our model economy may be sensitive to
monetary shocks. In Section 6 we summarize and conclude.
2. The Model
Our model is a K￿sector model building on the basic framework pioneered by
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987)2. In turn, each sector is comprised of a continuum
of ￿rms. Firms in each sector are monopolistic competitors. The marginal cost of
production (absent ￿xed costs of price adjustment) is constant across ￿rms and
sectors although, in equilibrium, ￿rms do not all charge the same price. At instant
t the optimal frictionless price for any ￿rm f in sector i is given by
p
￿(t;i;f) = P(t) + ￿Y (t): (2.1)
That is, the ￿ optimal￿price, in the absence of costs of adjustment, is a linear
function of (the log of) the aggregate price level P(t) and (the log of) real aggregate
2The underlying model is developed in more detail in the appendix, whilst in the main text
we use a linear approximate version.
4demand Y (t): ￿ is a measure of strategic interaction between ￿rms. In particular,
￿ < 1 indicates strategic complementarity such that ￿rms tends to raise their
prices when other ￿rms do the same. On the other hand, if ￿ > 1 ￿rms exhibit
strategic substitutability; ￿rm i tends to decrease its nominal price when other
￿rms increase them. From now on, where we can safely do so, we suppress the
index i, assuming that ￿ is the same across sectors. We distinguish between
di⁄erent sectors of the economy by the costs of price adjustment in each sector,
c 2 C: We assume that the costs of price adjustment are ￿ su¢ ciently di⁄erent￿
across sectors such that when one sector starts to change nominal prices, this does
not immediately cause ￿rms in ￿ nearby￿sectors to change prices.
The aggregate price-level and aggregate demand are de￿ned in the following
way,
















An appendix provides more details on the functions ￿[￿], ￿[￿]. The aggregate
price level is a function of sectoral prices, which are in turn themselves a basket
of individual ￿rms￿prices. Similar considerations obtain with respect to output.
There is a cost to changing prices and this cost di⁄ers systematically across sectors
of the economy which are enumerated by the number of elements (K) in the set
C3. In each sector we assume that the continuum of ￿rms all face the same cost.
In Caplin and Leahy (1997) C is a singleton. We assume that costs c are positive
and bounded, c 2 (0;cmax]. Firms in this economy will therefore di⁄er along two
dimensions. First, there will be, in equilibrium, a non-degenerate distribution of
relative prices within each sector. Second, the distribution of costs across sectors
will mean that di⁄erent sectors will produce di⁄erent levels of output, before
￿nally changing prices.
If velocity of money is constant, we may write the relationship between the
log of aggregate real money balances, M(t), and (demand-determined) output as
Y (t) = M(t) ￿ P(t): (2.2)
3We emphasise that costs of adjustment do not vary stochastically across ￿rms. The result
of randomly altering the costs of adjustment may have a limited impact on our analysis here,
as in Caballero and Engel (1991b), where the distribution of relative prices remains unaltered.
5We assume that money evolves continuously without drift,
dM(t) = ￿dW(t); (2.3)
where W(t) is a Wiener process.
Each ￿rm in each sector faces a control problem of the same sort. In what
follows, to avoid notational clutter, we shall drop the t index. For each ￿rm the
instantaneous loss in real pro￿ts is a quadratic function of the deviation of its
nominal price from the optimal price given by
L(p(i);Y;i) = ￿(p(i) ￿ p
￿(i))
2; (2.4)
= ￿(p(i) ￿ P ￿ ￿Y )
2;
= ￿(x(i) ￿ ￿Y )
2; (2.5)
where x(i) ￿ p(i) ￿ P is a relative price. In each sector agents face identical
problems i.e., to minimize the expected present value of lost pro￿t given the cost
of price adjustment. Assuming that the discount factor r is constant, the value
function of the ￿rm at moment t can be expressed in the form:













where Et stands for the expectations operator and the sequence fTjg represents
the time when the jth adjustment takes place.
As we show in the appendix, the value function is given by:
V (x;Y ) =
￿
r















































There are several other optimality conditions related to an equilibrium of the













6Then there is the value matching condition,
V (￿S;Y ) = V (S;Y ) + c: (2.8)
The optimal choice of target is given by
@V (x;Y )
@x





￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
x=S
; (2.9)
and the smooth pasting condition is
@V (x;Y )
@x
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
x=S;Y =Y
= 0: (2.10)
Appendix 2 derives the value function and evaluates the accompanying optimality
conditions to ￿nd a value for ￿, a variable de￿ned in the appendix, and a pair
of simultaneous equations necessary and su¢ cient to solve for Y and S. Here S
denotes denotes the lower bound on the real relative price, and Y the bound on
output.
3. The distribution of output and prices in di⁄erent sectors
In this section we take a closer look at the distributions of relative prices and
outputs in each sector of economy. In the one sector model with two sided shocks,
we know that relative (i.e., real) prices will optimally remain uniformly distributed,
if they are initially uniformly distributed. And the same is true for output; this
will also be uniformly distributed in the stationary state (Harrison, 1985). The
same applies in the case of a K-sector economy. In each sector the behavior of
agents is de￿ned by their costs of price adjustments. As already noted ￿rms face
the same optimization problem but with di⁄erent costs of price adjustment. The
next proposition will prove useful.





strictly increasing functions of cost.
Proof: The set of equations for determining optimal boundaries are derived in




tanh(￿Y ) = S coth(￿S)tanh(￿Y ); (3.1)
7S(￿Y ￿ tanh(￿Y )) = ￿c; (3.2)
where ￿ = r￿=(4￿￿) and ￿ =
p
2r=￿2.
The solutions of equations (3.1) and (3.2) determine optimal S and Y for
a particular sector c: Unfortunately, this system of equations does not yield an
analytical solution, but it is still possible to obtain asymptotic solutions in the
region of small and large costs of adjustments. We proceed by rewriting equation
(3.1):
￿S coth(￿S) ￿ 1
￿Y coth(￿Y ) ￿ 1
= ￿: (3.3)
Consider equation (3.2) and let c increase. It follows that the left hand side of
(3.2) must also increase. Consequently, there are three possibilities: Both S and Y
increase; S increases, while Y decreases with limY = constant > 0; or Y increases,
and S decreases with limS = constant > 0; the constant has to be positive to
keep the left hand side of (3.2) positive. It turns out that only the ￿rst of these
possibilities is a solution as the second and third violate condition (3.3). The
solutions of (3.1) and (3.2) for various costs are given in Figure 3.1. ￿











Figure 3.1: Optimal boundaries S(c), Y (c) as a functions of cost of price adjustments.
A direct consequence of Proposition 3.1 is that, in the stationary state, the
inaction regions [￿S(c);S(c)][[￿Y (c);Y (c)] are nested as depicted in Figure 3.2














Figure 3.2: Nested regions of innaction for two sectors. The sectoral densities of relative
prices (￿ elevators￿ ) in both sectors move up and down when money rises or falls.
for the case of two sectors. Hence we de￿ne a stationary equilibrium of our model
as a straightforward generalization of the one sector model of Caplin and Leahy
(1997):
De￿nition 3.2. : An equilibrium is an initial distribution of prices and set of
pricing strategies such that :
(i) the aggregate price index only changes when at least one sectoral output
level is at ￿Y (c) and relative prices hit ￿S(c);
(ii) in each sector ￿rms change their relative prices only when output is at
￿Y (c) and relative prices are at ￿S(c);
(iii) in each sector relative prices are distributed uniformly over the interval
[￿S(c);+S(c)];
(iv) no ￿rm deviates from the price adjustment strategy in (ii).
We conclude this section by formulating and proving one important result
about the distribution of relative prices: We show that the distribution of costs of
price adjustment determines the distribution of relative prices in an equilibrium.
For simplicity, consider the case of two sectors. Let total ￿rms be of measure
one. The measure of ￿rms in sectors one and two are denoted by n1 and n2,
9respectively. We then have that n1+ n2 = 1: Since in each sector the same rule
of price adjustment applies, the fraction n1 of ￿rms is uniformly distributed over
an interval of relative prices [￿S1;S1] and so too is the fraction n2 of ￿rms over
the interval [￿S2;S2]. We choose S1 < S2 (c1 < c2 ). The distribution of
aggregate relative prices is not uniform (as it would be in a single sector set-up)
but it is invariant in time as depicted in Figure 3.3. It is not hard to see that
any distributional shape can be achieved by choosing a speci￿c distribution of
costs, n(c). The corresponding densities for the case of two sectors are depicted in
Figure 3.3. By way of illustration, it is straightforward algebraically to describe






n2=2S2 ￿S2 ￿ x < ￿S1
n1=2S1 + n2=2S2 ￿S1 ￿ x ￿ S1






n3=2S3 ￿S3 ￿ x < ￿S2 [ S2 < x ￿ S3
n1=2S1 + n2=2S2 + n3=2S3 ￿S1 ￿ x ￿ S1
n2=2S2 + n3=2S3 ￿S2 ￿ x < ￿S1 [ S1 < x ￿ S2
: (3.5)
It is easy to show that
R
￿(x)dx = 1: In particular, for the two dimensional case
we have
R






2S2) = n1 + n2 = 1:
Proceeding further in the same fashion we can construct any distributional
shape by specifying n(c): The generalization of this analysis to the continuous
case is straightforward and we conclude this section by formulating it in the next
proposition.
Proposition 3.3. Let n(c) be the density of ￿rms in respect of their cost of
relative price adjustment, i.e.,
Z
n(c)dc = 1, where c takes its values from some







where x 2 [￿S(cmax);S(cmax)] and x and c are given by equations (3.1) and (3.2).
It is immediately clear that price changes are not synchronized across sectors.
For simplicity, consider the two sector case and assume that money rises. Then
102 S - 2 S 1 S -
1 S x
2 S - 2 S 1 S -
1 S x
Figure 3.3: The density of relative prices ￿2(x) (bold line) in the case of two sectors
de￿ned by (3.4). Dashed lines represent sectoral densities: 1/2S2 (lower line) and
1/2S1(upper line).
the "elevator" (that is, the distribution of relative prices) in the ￿rst sector (with
lower cost of adjustment) will hit the boundary Y 1 ￿rst, causing nominal price
adjustment in that sector while the elevator in the second sector will continue
to travel up towards to boundary Y 2 (see Figure 3.2). At that instant of time
adjustment will take place in the ￿rst sector only. The situation where ￿rms from
the sector with higher cost of adjustment change nominal prices but not ￿rms from
the lower cost sector is, of course, possible but only for particular paths de￿ned
on speci￿c initial conditions; it can only happen a ￿nite number of times. In the
stationary state it cannot be the case that the higher cost sector adjusts but the
lower cost sector does not. So in this model synchronization/asynchronization of
relative prices is understood as follows: When sector c￿ < cmax adjusts then all
sectors with costs c < c￿ also adjust, but those sectors with costs c > c￿, do not
necessarily adjust prices.
Overall, then, our model predicts that the frequency of price changes is likely
to di⁄er systematically across sectors, and that these changes will not be synchro-
nized. These ￿ndings appear to be broadly in line with Dhyne et al. (2004) where
a high degree of heterogeneity in price setting behavior, across both products and
sectors, is clearly documented. The heterogeneity is re￿ ected in the frequency of
price setting and in the absence of price change synchronization across di⁄erent
sectors. Interestingly, Dhyne et al. also document that there is no evidence of
11strong downward price rigidity in the Euro area. On average 40% of price changes
are downward movements. Our model with symmetric and nested boundaries is
also capable of generating similar behavior.
4. Stationary distribution of aggregate output in the case
of two sectors
We now consider the dynamics of aggregate output for the case where di⁄erent
costs of price adjustment lead to optimal boundaries for output, derived from
equations (2:6)￿(2:10), that are characterized by the strictly increasing ￿nite set, ￿
Y iji = 1;2:::K
￿
. Incorporating heterogeneity with respect to costs of price ad-
justment one would expect that the dynamics of aggregate output should change
materially from the one sector case, where we know that output is uniformly dis-
tributed. Indeed this is the case. Intuitively, although ￿rms in di⁄erent sectors
have di⁄erent costs of price adjustment, there will still be some range over which
their respective outputs rise and fall together. Eventually, however, demand rises
su¢ ciently that some ￿rms start adjusting nominal prices, whilst others continue
to meet demand at their current posted prices. At this point, their supply re-
sponses diverge. It turns out that the stationary distribution of aggregate output
can, therefore, be split into two parts. One part corresponds to the uniform
distribution of absolutely correlated outputs. The other part of the distribution
represents the sum of independent random variables. This is an important result
which, as we show in an appendix, is generalizable. We formally state this in the
next theorem for the two dimensional case, K = 2.
Theorem 4.1. Let the economy consists of K di⁄erent sectors with strictly in-
creasing optimal boundaries
￿
Y iji = 1;2
￿
. Let output Yi in each sector i follow
a regulated Brownian motion. Then, in the stationary state, the density function
of aggregate output, de￿ned as Y = Y1+Y2, is given by a weighted average of two
densities:
￿(Y ) = (1 ￿ !)￿1 + !￿2(Y = 2z1 + z2); (4.1)




Y 1(Y 2 ￿ Y 1)
Y 1Y 2
:
￿1 denotes the density of a uniformly distributed random variable on the interval





and ￿2 is the density of the sum of two independently and non-identically distrib-







2(Y2 ￿ Y 1)
:
PROOF: We are considering the two dimensional case K = 2 with bound-
aries Y 1 < Y 2: We may construct the state-space for pairs (Y1;Y2) shown in
Figure 4.1. For simplicity, and only temporarily, suppose that outputs Y1 and
Y2 take only discrete and equidistant integer values in the intervals [￿N1;N1]
and [￿N2;N2] respectively, i.e., Y1 2 f￿N1;￿N1 + 1;:;0;::;N1 ￿ 1;N1g and Y2 2
f￿N2;￿N2 + 1;:;0;::;N2 ￿ 1;N2g: The feasible set of states of the system are
those represented by points of the parallelogram ABCD including the points on
its boundaries. In principle the system can start from any point outside of this
set but once it reaches any point on its boundary (that will happen for sure in
￿nite time) it remains inside that set forever. After we characterize this density
for the discrete case, we generalize to the continuous case and all the results and
analysis will apply in the limit as ￿Y ! 0 (N ! 1), where we demonstrate that
￿Y = 2Y =(2N + 1):
We proceed directly to ￿nd the joint distribution in the stationary state, de-
noted by ￿(Y1;Y2), by solving the eigenvalue problem for the Markov transition
matrix P:
￿P = ￿: (4.2)
The number of di⁄erent states, i.e., the number of points in the set ACBD, is
n = n1n2 where n1 = 2N1 + 1 and n2 = 2(N2 ￿ N1) + 1: Obviously, dim(￿) = n
and P is a square matrix with dimensions n ￿ n:
If we consider any subset of admissible states with Y2 ￿xed (that is, points




￿(Y2;Yj), where p(Y2) is the unconditional probability of Y2, and
￿(Y2;Yi) are joint probabilities. However, it must be the case that p(Y2) = 1=n2
where n2 = 2N2 + 1 because in the stationary state outputs in each band are
13uniformly distributed. It follows, then, that the joint probabilities in corners A
and C are ￿A = ￿C = 1=n2: Now start from corner B and move to A along the
edge BA and write down the corresponding balance equations. As appendix 3





and along the edge CD by:
￿CD(￿) =
n1 + 1 ￿ ￿
n1n2
;
where ￿ = 1;2;::::n1. At all other points ￿ = ￿B = 1=n1n2:
Having calculated the stationary distribution of joint probabilities it is possible
to ￿nd the stationary probability distribution of aggregate output. We start by




P(￿ ￿ Y ): (4.3)




where the sum has to be taken over all values of Y1 and Y2 and where ￿ = Y1+Y2 ￿
Y . In Figure 4.1 it corresponds to all points lying on the line Y2 = ￿ ￿ Y1 for a
certain ￿. Combining (4.3) and (4.4) we see that in order to ￿nd the probability
function P(Y ) one has to sum joint probabilities over all points lying on the lines
Y1 + Y2 = ￿ ￿ Y: (4.5)
We perform this summation noticing that lines from (4.5) are divided into two
groups. It is worth noting now, that this sub-division provides us with our clue
on how to take these discrete calculations to the proper continuous limit. The
￿rst group is represented by lines containing the points on the edges AB and CD
where we have di⁄erent joint probabilities. We label such points as elements in
the ￿ exterior￿group (￿
E lines). The remaining probabilities are elements in the
￿ interior￿group (￿
I lines). These are depicted in Figure 4.1.
14Consider ￿rst the exterior group of lines and calculate P(￿) for an arbitrary
line. Before we proceed, we rewrite the joint probabilities of points lying on the
exterior lines in a more convenient forms as:
￿
￿(￿) = (￿￿ + Y 1 + 1)￿B
where ￿ = ￿Y 1;￿Y 1+1;:::::;Y 1￿1;Y 1; along the upper (+) and lower (￿) edges
respectively, and ￿B otherwise.
Now calculate P(￿) directly from (4.4) for some ￿. Let ￿Y ￿ Y 2 ￿ Y 1: The
line Y2 = ￿ ￿ Y1 intersects the upper edge BA in ￿ = (￿ ￿ ￿Y )=2 and the lower













where the last term is simply the number of points between intersections excluding




+ Y 1 + 1)￿B + (￿
￿ + ￿Y
2
+ Y 1 + 1)￿B + (￿Y ￿ 1)￿B;
= ￿￿Y ￿B + 2(Y 1 + 1)￿B + ￿Y ￿B ￿ ￿B;
= (2Y 1 + 1)￿B;
= 1=(2Y 2 + 1) = 1=n2:
When the line ￿ does not intersect both edges the above relations also hold. For
example we can conclude immediately that P(￿ = N1+N2) = P(￿ = ￿N1￿N2) =
1=n2 = 1=(2Y 2 + 1): Moving one step further from, for example, corner C gives:
￿￿(￿Y 1+1)+￿B = (￿(￿Y 1+1)+Y 1+1)￿B+￿B = (2Y 1+1)￿B = 1=(2Y 2+1):
Continuing in a similar fashion we conclude that for any ￿ representing an exterior
line, the sum of joint probabilities is the same and equal to 1=(2Y 2+1): For points
belonging to interior lines the contribution is simply equal to 1
n1n2n(￿), where n(￿)
is the number of points on the interior line, ￿













Let Y = Y 1 + Y 2 =
n1+n2











































Figure 4.1: Joint state space (Y1;Y2) for outputs from two sectors is represented by bold
dots for values Y 1 = 2; Y 2 = 4 so that Y1 = ￿2;￿1;0;1;2 and Y2 = ￿4;￿3;::0;::3;4
(n1 = 5; n2 = 9): Two way moving between the states is represented by bold lines while
one way moving is represented by arrowed lines. Arrowed circles represent possibilities
of remaining at corners A and C.
as must be the case.
It is easy to rewrite (4.6) in a more explicit form, but instead of that we now
proceed to derive an expression for the probability function in the continuous case.
Introduce the continuous variable ￿ 2 [0;2(a+b)] to enumerate aggregate output
from the interval [￿a ￿ b;a + b]: Then on the scale ￿ point D in Figure 4.1 has
coordinate 4a and the measure of edge DA is 2(b ￿ a): To see that this is indeed
the case recall that in the discrete case just half of the ￿ lines (here we speak of
￿ lines) terminate on edge CD: The measure of edge DA remains unchanged as
all ￿ lines terminate on this edge. In the continuous limit this must be preserved
so that on the scale ￿ properly applying (4.6) means changing ￿ ! ￿=2: The
situation is similar for n(￿), as it is just half of the interval lying on the ￿ line.
16To illustrate this, we now provide an explicit calculation of P(￿) for ￿ ￿ 2(b￿a):
Hence:
n(￿) = ￿=2;













Therefore, it follows that
n1 ! 2a;n2 ! 2b:



























Finally we write an expression for the probability function as a sum of two terms,
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Figure 4.2: Figure 4.2: Density function ￿(Y ):












































we recover expression (4.1) completing the proof.
As we conjectured above, we see that the density has two components. First,
we recognize the in￿ uence of the uniformly distributed outputs from the two
sectors that we intuited earlier. This is captured by the uniform density, 1=2(2b):
In Appendix 4 it is shown that in the general case of K sectors the uniform
part takes the form 1=K(2Y K): Second, there is the in￿ uence of the independent
portions of the sectoral outputs, that is the density for the sum of two independent
uniformly and nonidentically distributed random variables (see RØnyi, 1970). In
the above formulas for the probability function and the density function one should
make the substitution ￿ ! Y + a + b where ￿a ￿ b ￿ Y ￿ a + b (see Figure 4.2).
5. The Relationship Between Money, Output and Prices
In the model of Caplin and Leahy (1997), the implied dynamic interactions be-
tween money, output and prices were an improvement on earlier (S;s) pricing
18models, but still somewhat rudimentary. The improvement was that output and
money were positively correlated, up to a certain point, after which further changes
in the money stock resulted merely in a rise in prices. In other words, state-
dependent models were shown indeed to be consistent with Phillips-curve type
behavior of a general sort that seems to characterize the data in many advanced
industrial economies. On the downside, these dynamics seem somewhat ￿ angu-
lar￿ . Inside the barriers, output rises with money one for one; once the barriers
are reached, all further monetary shocks (in the same direction as those that led
output to hit the barrier) result merely in price rises4. In the case of K sectors
these dynamic interactions are smoother. At the aggregate level, output will not
in general change with money one-to-one, and the economy may be quite sensitive
to demand shocks; these are the main results we are going to show in this section.
It will be useful to work with an alternative de￿nition of regulated Brownian
motion using a state-space discretization, in the spirit of the previous section. In
the presence of two barriers ￿Y ;Y output Y follows regulated Brownian motion
dY (t) = dM(t) + dL(t) ￿ dU(t)
where lower and upper regulators, L(t) and U(t) respectively, are continuous and
non-decreasing stochastic processes, Y (t) 2 [￿Y ;Y ] for all t and L(t) increases
only when Y (t) = ￿Y and U(t) increases only when Y (t) = Y . The role of
regulators L;U is to keep output at the level Y = ￿Y (+Y ) when money fur-
ther decreases (increases). Then, at the next instant of time, output will stay at
the boundary with positive probability. To see that more clearly we construct
processes L;U in terms of the exogenous process M(t): We do that by approxi-
mating the process M(t) by a simple random walk on a lattice. Consider ￿rst the




maxs2[0;t] M(s) ￿ Y
t ￿ TY
t > TY
where the stopping time, TY, is de￿ned as the ￿rst time when M(t) = Y : Clearly




￿Y ￿ mins2[0;t] M(s)
t ￿ T￿Y
t > T￿Y
4It is worth emphasising that this qualitative feature of the model is not merely a function of
having closed the model with a simple quantity-type equation. With richer nominal speci￿cation,




Figure 5.1: Regulated Brownian motion starting at t = T1 and terminating at t =
T1+8 is illustrated. For example, on the upper boundary (left side) we have Y (T1+8) =
M(T1 + 8) ￿ maxM + Y = (Y + 2) ￿ (Y + 2) + Y = Y ￿ 1; and Y (T1 + 5) =
M(T1 +5)￿3+Y = Y +3￿3￿Y +Y = Y and on the lower boundary (right side)
Y (T1 + 8) = M(T1 + 8) ￿ Y ￿ minM = ￿Y ￿ Y ￿ (￿Y ￿ 2) = ￿Y + 2:
where T￿Y is de￿ned as the ￿rst time when M(t) = ￿Y : The above construction
ensures that Y (t) ￿ ￿Y for all t: In Figure 5.1 two cases with upper and lower
barriers are depicted. In the presence of two barriers the above constructions
still apply but one has to keep track of consecutive sequences of stopping times
[T2i+1;T2i] or [T2i;T2i+1] depending on wether the process M(t) crosses ￿rst the
upper or lower barrier; for more details see Stokey (2002). Instead of that, we
provide an alternative de￿nition for the regulated random walk.
De￿nition 5.1. Let random variable X follow a simple random walk5:
￿X(n) = X(n) ￿ X(n ￿ 1) =
￿
+￿ with probability 1=2
￿￿ with probability 1=2
We say that random variable Z follows a random walk regulated by variable X
and barriers ￿Y or follows a regulated random walk if
a) Z is bounded below and above, i.e.,￿Y ￿ Z(n) ￿ +Y ,(Y > 0) for all n
and
b)




0 if Z(n ￿ 1) = + Y and ￿X(n) = +￿
0 if Z(n ￿ 1) = ￿Y and ￿X(n) = ￿￿
￿X(n) otherwise
5"simple" means that we exclude the possibility: X(n) = X(n ￿ 1):
20We can now justify our claim that the dynamic between money and output
is indeed smoother in the heterogenous cost case. We do that by performing
simulations of the correlation between changes in the money supply and output
for one and two sector economies. As E(Y ) = E(￿M) = 0 the correlation function
is
￿(Y;M(t
0) ￿ M(t)) = E(Y ￿M);
where we use normalized variables ￿m=￿ and Y=
p
V ar(Y ). On the other hand
V ar(Y ) =
Z
Y
2￿1(2)(Y )dY , (5.1)
where for the one sector case ￿1(Y ) = 1=2Y , and for the two sector case ￿2(Y )
is given by (4.1). Using the de￿nition of regulated Brownian motion we simulate
paths of normalized Y and ￿M for both one and two sectors for di⁄erent values
of the standard deviation of money. Optimal boundaries Y (￿) are calculated
from equations (3.1) and (3.2) with parameters ￿ = 0:5; ￿ = 0:8; r = 0:05 and
c1 = 0:001; c2 = 0:002: Then time series of length N = 10000 for outputs Y1; Y
and ￿M are generated. Normalizing time to T = 1 we have that ￿t = 10￿5. We
found that t0￿t = 100￿t was enough to achieve reasonable convergence of outputs
to their limiting distributions. The results of these simulations are presented in
Figure 5.2.
For both cases there exists a maximum of the correlation function. We can
conjecture such a maximum with equations (3.1) and (3.2) from which it is easy
to verify that Y (￿)￿ ￿ changes sign from positive to negative after some value of
the variance ￿c. For our chosen set of parameters, ￿c = 0:033 in the one sector
case. We show that in the region ￿ < ￿c the correlation is an increasing function
of the variance of money. Before hitting the boundaries, the absolute value of
output increases with increasing j￿Mj and, in addition, with rising variance more
and more ￿rms ￿nd themselves at their respective boundaries, and hence are
compelled optimally to change their nominal prices. In the region ￿ > ￿c with
rising variance, Y rises allowing output to ￿ uctuate more widely (output is still
uniformly distributed) while at the same time ￿ uctuations in money are much
larger i.e., Y ￿ ￿: Again, this can be veri￿ed using (3:1) and (3:2).
If the standard deviation of the money supply process were to rise over any
￿nite period of time, then it can be shown that the probability of output reaching
its limits rises. As a result, the correlation coe¢ cient characterizing the money-
21output relation necessarily falls. That is the intuition behind Proposition 3 in
Caplin in Leahy (1997).
In the stationary state that reasoning is no longer valid. Output is distributed
uniformly over the whole interval [￿Y ;Y ]. Now as the variance of money increases
away from zero, Y rises more than proportionally with ￿, ￿Y (￿)= ￿￿ > 1.
Eventually, however, that e⁄ect subsides and the correlation coe¢ cient falls. In
Damjanovic and Nolan (2005) we analyze this issues further and show how it is
possible to derive an analytical expression for the correlation function, drawing
on the state-space discretization developed above.
Another striking features of this model is that aggregate output is less re-
sponsive to changes in the money supply for small values of the variance of the
money stock than is the case in the one sector economy. However, for larger vari-
ances, that e⁄ect is reversed and monetary shocks may have a larger impact in the
muti-sector economy. In the mutli-sector economy prices are less ￿ exible and so
monetary shocks can have a relatively large impact, particularly as the variance
grows; for the high cost sector it requires a relatively large change in the variance
of the money stock to counter the e⁄ect of widening barriers. Moreover, it ap-
pears from Figure 5.2 that the correlation between money and output may decline
only rather gradually, even as the variance becomes quite large. This may well
be a function of the fact that all goods in our economy are complements (perhaps
goods in di⁄erent sectors ought to be substitutes). We leave further investigation
of that issue to future research. Su¢ ce to say for the moment that the degree
of complementarity that we have assumed does not seem wildly out of line with
what other researchers have assumed.
6. Conclusion
This paper has presented a simple macroeconomic model with multiple sectors,
which di⁄er because ￿rms in one sector face higher costs of price adjustment than
￿rms in other sectors. Almost by construction, then, we build in an assumption
that ￿rms will tend to di⁄er in the frequency of nominal price adjustment. That
systematic di⁄erence was one of our motivating stylized facts. Based on that
assumption, our model is then capable of replicating, qualitatively, the other two
stylized facts; a potentially sizeable impact on output of a nominal shock, and a
degree of price change asynchronization across sectors.
We derived these results by characterizing the stationary distribution of ag-
gregate prices and output, given a stochastic driving process for money. We
























c1 = 0.001, c2 = 0.002
d(s.d.)=0.0001
Figure 5.2: Correlation between output Y and changes in the money supply for one
and two sectors respectively, as a function of the standard deviation of money, ￿:
23showed that introducing sectors with di⁄erent costs of relative price adjustment
may smooth the dynamics of aggregate output and money signi￿cantly in the
sense that output does not follow the money supply one-to-one any more. Al-
though sectoral outputs follow a regulated Brownian path with their own uniform
distribution in stationary state, in characterizing output at the aggregate level
we have to deal with the fact that sectoral outputs are also partially correlated.
The source of the correlation is, of course, due to the underlying process for the
money supply but the strength of the correlation depends how di⁄erent sectors
are (in terms of their costs of adjustment). The more similar are their costs of
adjustment, the more correlated are sectoral outputs, while the further apart they
are, the less correlated are outputs and the more asynchronized are sectoral price
changes. We spelled out the behavior of a two sector economy in some detail, but
by increasing the number of sectors the picture appears to remain qualitatively
the same. For example, the density of aggregate output continues to consist of
two parts; one component being simply the sum of independent random variables,
while the other re￿ ects the correlation across sectoral outputs. Regarding the
distribution of relative prices, the picture is no less interesting. The density of
relative prices is invariant in time and can in fact take any form. The particular
form it takes depends not only of the size of the adjustment costs, but also on the
distribution of ￿rms in respect of those costs.
(S;s) pricing models based on heterogeneous costs of price adjustment appear
to be a promising modelling route for macroeconomic models incorporating price
rigidity. Our simple extensions resulted in a model with interesting aggregate
dynamics, but also able to capture a number of important stylized facts recently
documented in empirical analyses of price rigidity.
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26Appendix 1: The Microfoundations of
the K-Sector Model
The simple approximate linear model that we use in this paper may be moti-
vated as a more or less straightforward generalization of the model of Blanchard
and Kiyotaki (1987). Consider an economy with k = 1;:::;K ￿nal composite good
sectors. Following Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2001)6 we employ the notion
of a competitive bundler who composes the output of the various sectors in the








where q(t;k) is itself an aggregate, competitively bundled, of ￿rms across the
various sectors. We detail the sectoral aggregates presently. The corresponding
price index for the economy can be shown to be,






where x(t;k) is again a sectoral index of prices, speci￿ed below.
We follow the convention in the (sS) pricing literature and tie nominal expen-
diture to the money stock, L(t), in a simple way:
Q(t) = L(t)=X(t):
The demand for the sectoral bundle is inversely related to its real price (mea-
sured with respect to the economy wide price-level, X(t):
q
d (t;k) = K
￿1 [x(t;k)=X (t)]
￿1 Q(t):
It follows immediately that nominal expenditure on each sectoral composite is
proportional to total nominal expenditure,
x(t;k)q
d (t;k) = K
￿1X(t)Q(t):
6Our precise notation is, however, closer to Canzoneri et al. (2004).
27We turn now to the sectoral aggregates. In each sector k there is a continuum











so that q(t;k;h) denotes the output of ￿rm h in sector k and time t. The corre-

















We now turn to calculate what the optimal price of a ￿rm in sector k would
be, were it free of any rigidity in the setting of price. Let us write total cost as




















Since all ￿rms would behave symmetrically in such a friction free scenario, we













By an appropriate choice of d we may normalize the ￿rst term to unity to
recover the origins of equation (2.1) in the main text, where logx￿(t;k;h) ￿
p￿(t;i), logX(t) ￿ P(t) and logQ(t) ￿ Y (t).
28Appendix 2: Deriving the Value
Function
Initially we work with the following two relationships.
rV (x;Y )dt = L(x;Y )dt + EdV (x;Y ); (A.1)
V1(x;Y ) = ￿V2(x;Y ); for Y = Y or ￿ Y : (A.2)





















We have that E(dM) = 0; and E(dM)2 = ￿2dt. We also know that
dx =
￿
￿dP; if the ￿rm does not adjust at moment t;
0; if other ￿rms do not adjust at moment t:










Taking expectations through this function and using the resulting expression in
(A.1), yields







As the loss function is quadratic, it is reasonable to assert @2V=@Y 2 = 2￿2￿=r, so
that
V (x;Y ) =
￿
r






(A.3) also implies that ￿ = ￿
p
2r=￿2, so that the solution to (A.3) is given by,
V (x;Y ) =
￿
r






















(1 ￿ ￿)(￿Y ￿ x):










(1 ￿ ￿)(￿Y ￿ x): (A.6)
As a result, (A.5) becomes
V (x;Y ) =
￿
r








Solving (A.6) and using the result in (A.7) ￿nally recovers the value function. The
general solution to (A.6) may be written as
￿(x) = A + Bx + ￿e
￿￿x;
where ￿e￿￿x is the solution to the homogenous part of (A.6). It follows that
￿
0(x) = B ￿ ￿￿e
￿￿x;
and, by symmetry, that
￿(￿x) = A ￿ Bx + ￿e
￿x;
￿
0(￿x) = B ￿ ￿￿e
￿x:







































Hence, recalling the value function expression,
V (x;Y ) =
￿
r









V (x;Y ) =
￿
r















































This is expression in the main text and is the same as equation (4.1) in Caplin
and Leahy (1997).
There are several other optimality conditions related to an equilibrium of the













Then there is the value matching condition,
V (￿S;Y ) = V (S;Y ) + c: (A.10)
The optimal choice of target is given by
@V (x;Y )
@x





￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
x=S
: (A.11)







These last two relations may be written more compactly as
@V (x;Y )
@x





￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
x=￿S
(A.13)
It will be convenient to write the value function in a slightly di⁄erent way.
V (x;Y ) =
￿
r

































￿(x￿Y ) + e
￿￿(x￿Y )): (A.14)




































tanh￿Y ￿ 4￿sinh￿S sinh￿Y = c: (A.15)




(S ￿ ￿Y ) +
2￿
r￿












(S + ￿Y ) +
2￿
r￿




















tanh￿Y = S coth￿S tanhtanh￿Y (A.17)
(A.16) in (A.15) yields
S =
r￿c
4￿￿(￿Y ￿ tanh￿Y )
(A.18)
(A.17) and (A.18) are two equations in two unknowns, Y and S.
32Appendix3:DerivingtheStationaryDis-
tribution of Output
Starting from corner B and moving along to A along the edge BA we may



















￿(n1) = ￿A = n1￿B:
Hence ￿A = 1=n2 and from the last equation it follows that ￿B = 1=n1n2: By




and along the edge CD by
￿CD(x) =
n1 + 1 ￿ ￿
n1n2
;
where ￿ = 1;2;::::n1. To see where this latter relation comes from, note that as
we move along edge CD the probabilities are falling, as opposed to rising (along
BA). So, we have that
￿C = ￿(1);
￿(1) = n1￿D;
￿(2) = (n1 ￿ 1)￿D;
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::
￿(n1) = (n1 ￿ 1 + 1)￿D:
33Proceeding in the same fashion we ￿nd that all remaining points in the joint
probability equal ￿B: Consequently, the balance equations are satis￿ed for all





￿BA(￿ ￿ 1) +
1
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n1 + 1 ￿ ￿
n1n2
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n1n2: Finally, we require that the probabilities sum to unity:
X
￿

















n1(n2 ￿ n1 ￿ 1)
n1n2
= 1:
This completes the solution of equation (4.2).
To further illustrate our solution we rely on the well known fact that P k ! P ?
in the limit as k ! 1 where P ? is a stationary Markov matrix whose rows are
identical and equal to the stationary eigenvalue vector ￿￿: We chose N1 = 2;N2 =
344 so that n1 = 5 and n2 = 9 and the dimension of the transition matrix is 25￿25
(see the Figure 4.1 in the main text): We enumerate states by index j as follows.
The ￿rst state, represented by the point A, is the state with j = 1 and the
last state, represented by C, with j = 25:After a su¢ ciently large number, k, of




from which we read for example ￿A = ￿C = 1=n2 = 1=9 = 0:1111; ￿B = 1=n1n2 =
1=45 = 0:02222 and so on.
35Appendix4:DerivingtheStationaryDis-
tribution of Output for three sectors
To ￿nd the stationary distribution of aggregate output in the case of a three-
sector model we proceed in the same fashion as in the case of two sectors. In
each sector let output yi; follow regulated Brownian motions inside their own
boundaries [￿Y i;Y i] respectively where i = 1;2;3. As in the case of two sectors
we start in a discrete setting constructing the state space the grid fn1;n2;n3g
where n1 < n2 < n3
7: The same arguments as in the two-sector model apply
here: the initial state fn1(0);n2(0);n3(0)g can be any point in the parallelepiped
n1n2n3 but moving through the state space afterward is only in the direction
toward interior parallelepiped ABCDABCD as depicted in Figure 6.1. Once the
state reaches the interior parallelepiped it stays inside it forever.
In stationary state each sectoral output is uniformly distributed inside its own
boundaries and in order to ￿nd the stationary distribution for aggregate output
de￿ned in the usual way as
Y = Y1 + Y2 + Y3
we have to ￿nd the joint probabilities ￿(Y1;Y2;Y3) which in the stationary state




where P is a Markov transition matrix de￿ned on the state space as follows. To
simplify the analysis we move, as before, to an equivalent representation where
states are represented by discrete points in a three-dimensional box n1 ￿ (n2 ￿
n1)￿(n3￿n2) as depicted in Figure 6.2 (this is equivalent to moving from the old
coordinate system fY1;Y2;Y3g in Figure 6.1 to the new one f￿;￿;￿g in Figure 6.2).
The possible transitions are represented by arrows with transition probabilities
equal to 1=2: It is clear that the corresponding Markov chain consists of n3 ￿
n2 connected two-dimensional chains, embedded in n1 ￿ (n2 ￿ n1) rectangles;
this is reminiscent of our two sector analysis, although there are some important
di⁄erences, which we shall come to presently. The similarity is apparent at the
AA and CC edges; when the state is on the edge CC we can either move up to
the next rectangle (if money rises) or move back along the line belonging to the
plane CDCD; just as in the two-sector case. However, we see that the di⁄erence
7ni = 2Yi + 1 where all numbers are integers. The continous case is obtained by setting














Figure 6.1: Assuming that money falls continuously then starting from the initial point
O, we move toward O0 along the line x = y = z = const1 and then to the edge D
along the line x = 0; y = z = const2 .
37between this case and the two-sector case is that the state instead of staying at the
ending point (n1;n2) with the probability 1=2, can now move upwards. Identical
reasoning applies for states on edge AA; as they can either move back (if money
rises) along the line belonging to the plane ABAB or move down (if money falls) to
the next rectangle. Moving along the ￿rst ABCD and the last rectangle ABCD is
identical except at points A and D where with probability 1=2 in the next instant
of time states can freeze if money further falls/rises respectively (this situation is
represented by the circled arrow). Now it is clear that all states in our Markov
chain ￿ communicate￿that is, for any two states i and j we have P(i ! j) > 0 .
In other words there is at least one path leading from i to j. That means there
exists an n ￿ 1 so that all elements of stochastic matrix P n are strictly positive
i.e. P n(i;j) > 0 8(i;j): Then P has a unique stationary distribution; that is (6.1)
has a unique solution ￿￿. Moreover lim
t!1￿(t) = ￿￿ independently of the initial
distribution ￿(0):The solution of (6.1) in units 1=n1n2n3 is given by:
￿(AB) = ￿(￿;1;1) = n2(n1 + 1 ￿ ￿) ￿ = 1;::;n1
￿(DC) = ￿(￿;n2 ￿ n1 + 1;n3 ￿ n2 + 1) = n2￿ ￿ = 1;::;n1
￿(AA) = ￿(1;1;￿) = n1 ￿ = 2;::;n3 ￿ n2 + 1
￿(CC) = ￿(n1;n2 ￿ n1 + 1;￿) = n1 ￿ = 1;::;n3 ￿ n2
￿(ABBA) = ￿(￿;1;￿) = n1 + 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ = 2;::;n3 ￿ n2 + 1
￿ = 1;::;n1
￿(DCCD) = ￿(￿;n2 ￿ n1 + 1;￿) = ￿ ￿ = 1;::;n3 ￿ n2
￿ = 1;::;n1
￿(ABCDnAB) = ￿(￿;￿;1) = n2 ￿ n1 + 1 + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = 2;::;n2 ￿ n1 + 1
￿ = 1;::;n1
￿(ABCDnDC) = ￿(￿;￿;n3 ￿ n2 + 1) = n1 ￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿ = 1;::n2 ￿ n1
￿ = 1;::;n1
￿(￿;￿;￿) = 1 everywhere else
One can check that the local balance equations are satis￿ed at each point.
The stationary distribution ￿(￿;￿;￿) represents the occupancy measure of the
state (￿;￿;￿) which is just the joint probability function. Then, in the usual way,
we may write the probability distribution function for aggregate output as






































Figure 6.2: The state space in the new coordinate system (￿;￿;￿) is presented together
with the plane 3￿ + 2￿ + ￿ = Y :
39In terms of the new coordinates f￿;￿;￿g; the condition Y ￿ Y is equivalent to
3￿ + 2￿ + ￿ ￿ Y which may be interpreted in the following way: The initial
problem of ￿nding the probability distribution function of the sum of correlated
and uniformly distributed random variables Y1;Y2;Y2 on the intervals n1;n2 and
n3 respectively is now transformed, due to the existence of the restricted joint state
space, into ￿nding the probability distribution function of a new random variable
z = 3￿+2￿+￿ where the probability distribution functions of the random variables
￿;￿;￿ are given by:












respectively. We calculate the above probabilities for the continuous case where
the sums become Riemann integrals. We perform integration separately over the
regions where ￿ 6= 1 and over interior points where ￿ = 1: The integrations are
trivial so in order to illustrate transition to the continuos case we perform in detail
just part of the summation for P(￿ ￿ ￿) along line AB;






n2(n1 + 1 ￿ ￿)
n1n2n3
:
Now let n1;n2;n3 ! 1 in such a way that n1￿n ! n1; n2￿n ! n2 and n3￿n !
n3 where all ni are continuous and ￿n is an in￿nitesimal increment along the
axes. Then, taking limits we have in terms of continuous variables
lim












In the continuous case, equations (6.3),(6.4) and (6.5) become




40The random variable ￿ is uniformly distributed on the interval [0;n1] with den-
sity 1=n1: For densities for ￿ and ￿ are not properly de￿ned because they are
discontinuous at the end points





2n2 ￿ = 0
￿
n2 ￿ 2 (0;n2 ￿ n1)
n1
2n2 ￿ = n2 ￿ n1
and





2n3 ￿ = 0
￿
n3 ￿ 2 (0;n3 ￿ n2)
n2
2n3 ￿ = n3 ￿ n2
One can easily check that P(￿ ￿ n1) = P(￿ ￿ n2 ￿ n1) = P(￿ ￿ n3 ￿ n2) = 1:
Although unconditional probabilities of random variables ￿ and ￿ are discontinu-
ous functions it turns out that the joint probability function de￿ned in the usual
way as








This function is absolutely continuous and an increasing function. In (6.6),
￿(￿;￿;￿) is now a function of continuous variables de￿ned by:
￿(AB) = ￿(￿;0;0) = n2(n1 ￿ ￿)
￿(DC) = ￿(￿;n2 ￿ n1;n3 ￿ n2) = n2￿
￿(AA) = ￿(0;0;￿) = n1
￿(CC) = ￿(n1;n2 ￿ n10;￿) = n1
￿(ABBA) = ￿(￿;0;￿) = n1 ￿ ￿
￿(DCCD) = ￿(￿;n2 ￿ n1;￿) = ￿
￿(ABCDnAB) = ￿(￿;￿;0) = n2 ￿ n1 + ￿ ￿ ￿
￿(ABCDnDC) = ￿(￿;￿;n3 ￿ n2) = n1 ￿ ￿ + ￿
￿(￿;￿;￿) = 1 everywhere else
The previous analysis was necessary to justify why one can calculate ￿rst P(Y ￿
Y ) and then density ￿(Y ) in the continuous case: It is clear now that (6.2) in the
continuous case reads:




41where the integration region ￿ is that sub-space obtained by cutting the state
space by the plane 3￿ + 2￿ + ￿ = Y (Figure 6.2.). To illustrate this we calculate
P(Y ￿ Y ) for some Y < 3n1: First, let Y < 2(n2 ￿ n1) and Y < n3 ￿ n2 which
corresponds to the situation depicted in Figure 6.2. Let ￿ = ￿1+ ￿2+ ￿3+ ￿4
where ￿1; ￿2; ￿3 and ￿4 represent the line of integration along the ￿ axis, the
set in the plane ￿ = 0, the set in the plane ￿ = 0 and the interior points in the
integration space respectively. Then (in 1=n1n2n3 units)
P(Y = 3￿ + 2￿ + ￿ ￿ Y ) =
Z
￿
￿￿d￿d￿d￿ = I￿1 + I￿2 + I￿3 + I￿4 = (6.8)
Y =3 Z
0




























































We see that the density starts from the value ￿(0) = 1=3n3 which is similar to
the two dimensional case with the ￿ dimensionality￿factor 1=3: This leads us to
conjecture that in the K￿dimensional case this will read ￿(K) = 1=KnK: Indeed,
note that when Y = 0 and Y = n1+n2+:::+nK the only states are (0;0;:::;0) and
(n1;n2;:::;nK); respectively (i.e., the two points in planes YK = 0 and YK = nK)
and the joint probabilities are for these two states equal to the unconditional prob-
ability, 1=nK: However, due to the symmetry in the K￿dimensional hypercube we
will have two lines of discontinuity. One beginning from (0;0;:::;0) and terminat-
ing on (n1;0;:::;0); and another beginning from (n1;n2;:::;nK) and terminating
on (0;n2;:::;nK): Along the ￿rst one joint probabilities are given by
￿(￿;0;0;:::;0) = nK￿1nK￿2 ￿ ￿n2(n1 ￿ ￿); (6.12)
42and along the second one by
￿(￿;n2;:::;nK) = nK￿1nK￿2 ￿ ￿n2￿:
Then, by de￿ning new random variables ￿i; i = 1;2;::K with corresponding densi-
ties ￿1 = 1=n1 and ￿i = 1=(ni ￿ni￿1) for i 6= 1; expressing Y in the new variables
as
Y = K￿1 + (K ￿ 1)￿2 + (K ￿ 2)￿3 + ￿ ￿ +￿K;
and performing an integration (6.12) in the hypercube along the edge (￿1;0;:::;0)
up to the intersection with hyperplane Y = K￿1+
K P
i=2
(K￿i+1)￿i, we get Y=KnK
in an expression for the probability function. Because the probability function is
strictly increasing in Y we always have a simple relation P(Y ) ￿ Y=KnK: Due
to the symmetry of the probability function we have another relation in the site
(n1;n2;:::;nK); P(Y ) ￿ Y=KnK + 1 ￿
P
ni=KnK: The probability function for
n1 = 0:19; n2 = 0:81 and n3 = 1:77 is plotted in Figure 6.3. With an increased
number of dimensions (sectors), calculating the probability distribution analyt-
ically becomes more and more cumbersome. Nevertheless, we still can provide
an accurate answer as to how the probability distribution or density of aggregate
output behaves when the number of sectors increases. We already know that
Y=KnK ￿ P(Y ) ￿ Y=KnK + 1 ￿
P
ni=KnK and that the density is shifted ￿ up-
wards￿by the amount 1=KnK: We saw that it can be interpreted as a weighted
uniform measure over the whole interval [0;
P
ni]: What remains can be repre-
sented by a weighted mixture of other densities. In other words, when we calculate
the probability P(Y ￿ Y ) which is simply a sum, we are free to rearrange this sum
as we wish. For example in the two dimensional case we rearranged the sum in a
speci￿c way over the interior and exterior sets. But in fact we could rearrange
the sum in another way considering separately the boundary points and entire
interior set (where the joint probabilities are all equal to unity) arriving at the
same result. This motivates us to approximate the density function for aggregate





+ (1 ￿ !)￿(Y =
K X
i=1
(K ￿ i + 1)￿i) (6.13)
where ! =
P
ni=KnK and ￿ is density function of the sum of K independently8
8By increasing the number of sectors to K ￿ 3 (dimensions), splitting the density of aggregate
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Figure 6.3: Probability functions for aggregate output for three sector model are shown.
The exact one P true is obtained by integrating (6.7) over the whole range of Y. The
second one P app is obtained by integrating (6.13)
and nonidentically uniformly distributed random variables 0 ￿ ￿i ￿ ni￿ni￿1 with
densities ￿(￿i) = 1=(ni ￿ ni￿1); i = 1;2;:::K; and n0 = 0:
output between a uniform part and the rest is not as simple as in the case of two sectors. Here
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